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Abstract. The paper begins by arguing that additional theorizing about
mathematical practice is needed in order to ground appeals to truly useful
notions of the virtues in mathematics. It then aims to contribute to this
theorizing, first, by characterizing mathematical practice as being epistemic
and “objectual” in the sense of Knorr Cetina (2001). Then, it elaborates a
MacIntyrean framework for extracting conceptions of the virtues related to
mathematical practice so understood. Finally, it makes the case that Wittgen-
stein’s methodology for approaching mathematics and its practice provides
the appropriate perspective from which to undertake the actual investigation
of mathematical practice within this MacIntyrean framework for the virtues.
During each stage of thinking through mathematical practice by these means,
places where new virtue-theoretic questions are opened up for investigation
are noted and briefly explored.
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1 Introduction
That the concept of a virtue requires some prior account of the “features of so-
cial and moral life in terms of which it has to be defined and explained” is one of
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the key ideas of Alasdair MacIntyre’s After Virtue.1 It’s natural for anyone taking
a “practice-first” approach to the philosophy of mathematics to share this basic
sentiment and, therefore, suggest that a more sophisticated view of the structural
features of mathematical practice in terms which virtue-theoretic concepts can be
defined and explained is necessary prior to the effective application of such con-
cepts to mathematics and its practice. In what follows, I’ll aim to facilitate this
kind of application by improving upon existing accounts of practice and virtue
employed in the field, while also taking note of places where this improved ac-
count makes room for interesting virtue-theoretic studies to be undertaken.2
In more detail, the plan for the paper is as follows. In Section 2, I’ll argue that
there is still room for expanding on the notions of mathematical practice most com-
monly relied upon in the literature. Next, Section 3 will begin to fill in this room
by characterizing mathematical practice generally as being an epistemic, “objec-
tual” practice in the sense of Knorr Cetina (2001). MacIntyre’s three-part analysis
of the concept of a virtue relative to a practice will then be used to lay out a broad
framework for exploring mathematical practice and extracting conceptions of the
virtues in connection with it in Section 4. It’s primarily here that we’ll see an
opening of new space for thinking about roles for the virtues—both intellectual
and practical—in the world of mathematics. Section 5 will go on to outline a “re-
alistic” methodology that I’ll argue should be employed when investigating the
various aspects of mathematical practice delineated thus far.3 The usefulness of a
1(MacIntyre 1981: 186)
2Note that my claim isn’t that pursuing, say, a virtue-based epistemology for mathematical knowl-
edge as in Tanswell (2016) needs to wait until we have a perfectly adequate understanding of math-
ematical practice. However, the more realistic and detailed our picture of the kind of practical and
intellectual virtues a mathematical knower can be expected to exhibit is, the more likely a view of
this sort is to be compelling. My contention is simply that a clearer view of mathematical practice
can help provide this more realistic view of the virtues surrounding the practice.
3This type of realistic approach—characterized by “the realistic spirit,” which looks to pay close
attention to our ordinary, everyday practices—is largely inspired by the work of Ludwig Wittgen-
stein (in Wittgenstein (1953/2009), for example), who in many ways is rightly seen as a philoso-
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realistic methodology of this sort will be briefly illustrated in this section as well
in relation to the question of the (dis)unity of mathematicians’ opinions about the
virtues of certain styles of proof. Finally, I’ll close in Section 6 by discussing some
of the questions this general approach to the philosophy of mathematical practice
ought to lead us to pose and by noting some prospects for future virtue-theoretic
work in this direction.
2 On the Need for and Problems with Theorizing
Practice
Juliet Floyd has recently called for more efforts aimed at theorizing mathemati-
cal practice in practice-oriented philosophy of mathematics, suggesting that “not
enough has been done to pick apart the force, the character, and the scope of what
an appeal to, or characterization of, mathematical practice should and can be.”4
That she’s right to make this request can be seen by looking at some of the charac-
terizations of practice that philosophers of mathematics currently work with: e.g.,
“By a “practice” in general I mean a recognizable type of activity that is done—
and can be taught and learned—by human agents,”5 or, “In general a practice is
captured by a tuple consisting of ‘agents’ and ‘mathematics’, which can be written
as ⟨A,M⟩.”6,7 These definitions of practice (and others like them) seem to be un-
exceptionable as far as they go, but they also don’t seem to go very far. Even when
pher of mathematical practice. Cf., e.g., Shanker (1987), Mühlhölzer (2010), Floyd (2012), and
Mühlhölzer (2014). See also Diamond (1996), (Laugier 2013: xi-xii), and (Methven 2015: Ch. 1)
on “ordinary realism” and the realistic spirit.
4(Floyd 2015: 17)
5(Ferreirós 2016: 28, emphasis in the original)
6(Carter 2019: 24)
7It’s not my intention to single out any particular definition of practice as being especially bad of
course. On its own, the fact that there are so many attempts to say what a practice is supposed to
be in the philosophy of mathematics already suggests that there’s still work to be done.
3
Jessica Carter draws on some of the ideas in Soler (2012) to help particularize
the general “tuple”-definition of practice she begins with, we’re only told that we
should further see mathematical practice (roughly) as a cluster of ongoing, human
processes that make up the ordinary (i.e., day-to-day and non-idealized) activities
of mathematicians.8
Philip Kitcher’s earlier analysis of mathematical practice as consisting of “a
language, a set of accepted statements, a set of accepted reasonings, a set of ques-
tions selected as important, and a set of metamathematical views”9 and its expan-
sion in Van Bendegem and Van Kerkhove (2004)10 looks like it offers more tools
and concepts to work with, but the definition still appears rather abstract and static
when compared to characterizations of practice routinely put to use in the social,
moral, or political sciences.11 Consider, for instance, Joseph Dunne’s restatement
of MacIntyre’s well-known account of practice from After Virtue.
[A practice] is a coherent, complex set of activities that has evolved
cooperatively and cumulatively over time, that is alive in the commu-
nity who are its practitioners, and that remains alive only so long as
they remain committed to sustaining – and creatively developing and
extending – its internal goods and its proper standards of excellence
(this commitment constituting them as a community) (Dunne 2005:
367).
I expect that this way of conceptualizing a practice immediately sounds like it
provides a richer core idea around which to connect the details of something like
Kitcher’s or VanBendegem andVanKerkhove’s tuples than the previously-mentioned
8See (Carter 2019: 25-26).
9(Kitcher 1984: 163-165)
10“Math[imatical]Pract[ice] = ⟨M,P , F , PM,C,AM, PS,…⟩ (as a reminder: M = com-
munity of mathematicians, P = research program, F = formal language, PM = proof meth-
ods, C = concepts, AM = argumentative methods, PS = proof strategies)” (Van Bendegem and
Van Kerkhove 2004: 534).
11See, e.g., (Rouse 2003: Ch. 5) for discussion.
4
starting points, but I take it to be clear that at least prima facie reason has been given
to think that philosophers of mathematics need to spend some time arguing for and
about the very conception of mathematical practice that gives practice-oriented
philosophy of mathematics its distinctive character.12 This is, again, especially
true for virtue-based investigations in the philosophy of mathematics if an account
of the practice must be in place before we can hope for effective thinking about
mathematical virtues to get underway.
That this theorizing and argumentation hasn’t occurred to the extent that it
should have may be traceable to the relative youth of the practice-first approach
or to the distance between the interests of many mathematically-minded philoso-
phers and, say, sociology. But the lack can also potentially be explained by some of
the aims of the practice-first approach itself. Philosophers taking this view of the
subject have often done so with a fear of philosophical presuppositions infecting
their observations of mathematics and its practices.13 By looking at mathematical
practice with eyes unobstructed by prior theorizing, they’ve hoped to be able to ob-
serve the world ofmathematics and ofmathematicians without the worry of uncon-
sciously cherry-picking cases and examples to arrive at antecedently-determined
conclusions. There are echoes here, however, of the “dilemma of case studies”
faced by other philosophers of science years ago: if we approach mathematical
practice looking to confirm our preconceived notions of it, it’s not clear that the
data we’ll appeal to hasn’t been manipulated to fit the notions; if we start with a
simple case study, on the other hand, it’s not clear how to proceed from there—it’s
unreasonable to generalize from a case or two or three.14 Obviously, there’s some-
thing correct about this sort of concern and the attempts to assuage it that come out
of the “anti-theory” line of thought. But since the dilemma of case studies has rea-
12I am, therefore, basically in agreement with Colin Rittberg that “[t]he philosophy of mathematics
needs a body of knowledge which critically assesses our philosophical methods (to engage with
mathematical practices and otherwise)” (Rittberg 2019: 14).
13See Cellucci (2013) for a discussion of “top-down” and “bottom-up” philosophy of mathematics.
14This version of the dilemma is taken almost verbatim from (Pitt 2001: 373).
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sonably been thought to have been overcome in the rest of philosophy of science,
we shouldn’t especially take ourselves to be caught on its horns in the philosophy
of mathematics. As Richard Burian writes, “[M]ethodologically and epistemo-
logically useful case studies need not be philosophically innocent and need not
proceed to grand conclusions by induction from absurdly small samples.”15 We
should, this suggests, forge ahead with theorizing about what mathematical prac-
tice is and can be, and about our methodological principles in general, without
fearing too much the pollution of our vision by theory.
3 Mathematical Practice as an Epistemic, Objectual
Practice
Let’s return then to the theorizing and conceptualization of practice and take as a
starting point the much-quoted characterization found in After Virtue.
By a ‘practice’ I am going to mean any coherent and complex form of
socially established cooperative human activity through which goods
internal to that form of activity are realized in the course of trying to
achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and
partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the result that human
powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and
goods involved, are systematically extended (MacIntyre 1981: 187).
This way of conceiving of a practice adds to standard accounts by making efforts
to extend and develop certain forms of goods and excellences pursued within the
practice partially constitutive of the cooperative activity itself. That is, a practice
in MacIntyre’s sense is still seen as being a “a temporally unfolding and spatially
dispersed nexus of doings and sayings,” where the doings and sayings form a nexus
15(Burian 2001: 388)
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because they are connected in various ways: e.g., through shared practical under-
standings or interpretations; through explicit rules or principles; and through em-
bracing ends or beliefs.16 But these temporal unfoldings are specialized to those
for which goods “internal” to the activity can be achieved and enriched as well as to
those that expand on some version of human flourishing through the achievement
of excellence(s). Whether or not every practice is really a practice in MacIntyre’s
sense can be set aside for now, since I take it that the main object of concern here,
mathematical practice, does have the features of a practice in this, perhaps special,
sense.
In order to fully understand MacIntyre’s conception of a practice, we need to
have the idea of what an “internal good” is supposed to be in hand first. MacIntyre
himself illustrates the distinction between internal and “external” goods by consid-
ering a parent trying to teach her daughter to play chess. As motivation, the parent
offers the child a piece of candy every time she wins a game. The child can man-
age to get candy in many other ways (let’s suppose), but she can only get the goods
of a certain kind of competition and intellectual excellence through learning how
to identify with them as she engages in the practice of chess. She can only recog-
nize these goods as goods through her participation in and shaping by the practice.
MacIntyre calls goods achievable and recognizable in this way “internal,” while
goods like candy, fame, and fortune are said to be “external.”17,18 We’ll see in Sec-
tion 4, that virtues for MacIntyre are initially characterized as qualities that allow
16(Schatzki 1996: 89)
17Internal goods are also characterized by being less likely to be limited in supply and less likely
to be limited to being good just for me than external goods. So, if I get a raise, that means there’s
less money in the company available for you, and you’re not particularly benefited by my improved
financial standing. But if I invent a new technique in painting—a technique that can perhaps be
seen to be the good that it is only by those within the practice—the practice is now no less likely to
develop other new techniques and you can also benefit from my advance nearly as much as I can.
18Using this terminology, we can say that (Bourdieu 1977: 183) suggests, contra MacIntyre, that
people take part in practices aiming for the external good of “symbolic capital.” Cf. (Hicks and
Stapleford 2016: 463).
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a person to better achieve the goods that can be found internal to practices, but for
now I’ll turn to the work of Karin Knorr Cetina to help further clarify the nature
of mathematical practice as one MacIntyrean practice among many.
Some human practices pursue excellence in various forms of behaving or think-
ing; e.g., as in the practice of farming or of chess. These practices can generate
large bodies of knowledge, but may not be best seen as essentially aiming at the
generation of such knowledge. (Instead, the aims may be to produce healthful food
responsibly or to win a position intelligently.) Mathematical practice, however—
whatever else it may be—does seem to be properly conceived of as “knowledge-
centered” or, in other words, as an “epistemic” practice. Among their other activi-
ties, mathematicians must generate and manage practices for acquiring knowledge
about their areas of specialization as well as continually formulate, confront, and
solve nonroutine problems, which further generate bodies of knowledge andmeans
of understanding. These features of mathematical practice make it a creative and
constructive practice of the sort Knorr Cetina characterizes in her work on “objec-
tual practices,” where an objectual practice is one that seeks to produce knowledge
and understanding of “epistemic objects,” a type of object that will be characterized
with the help of Heidegger presently.19 Knorr Cetina is correct when she points
out that objectual practices require the use of concepts different from the ones that
have been developed for thinking about more practical practices like baseball or
cooking. These objectual practices minimally present us with unique additional
questions,“For example, how can we theorize practice in a way that allows for the
engrossment and excitement—the emotional basis—of research work? What char-
acterization of practice might make the notion more dynamic and include within
it the potential for change?”20
19See, e.g., Knorr Cetina (2001) and (Knorr-Cetina 1981: 152). Knorr Cetina’s work has been
influential in sociology of science studies, but unfortunately seems not to have made its way into
the literature of philosophy of mathematics yet.
20(Knorr Cetina 2001: 184)
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In order to get a sense of what Knorr Cetina means by an “epistemic object”—
the type of object investigated by an objectual practice—it will be useful to em-
ploy (as she does herself) Heidegger’s notion of an object being “ready-to-hand”
(Zuhanden). The idea of readiness-to-hand has been thought to capture well the
way in which a tool in the hands of an expert user can function effortlessly and
even seem to vanish from the user’s awareness (as the practitioner herself may
vanish from her own purview when engrossed in a project).21 Although there are
certainly times within ordinary mathematical practice when objects or techniques
appear as being ready-to-be-used without further thought (e.g., once a space has
been mapped to an algebraic object, the tools of group theory may seem to almost
apply themselves), it’s also just as certain that objects of study may present them-
selves as unwieldy or as obstacles to be overcome for which one can find no tool
to attack properly (e.g., most of the questions about the rationality or irrationality
of numbers like e, , and so on are unsettled and often thought to be beyond
the reach of current methods). In other words, in mathematical research, the re-
searcher may often find that her objects of investigation are unknown or incomplete
in various ways or that her tools appear to be useless and very much not working
smoothly and invisibly along with her intentions; i.e., they suddenly appear to be
anything but ready-to-hand.22 It’s the stubborn, unknown, and incomplete nature
of an object under investigation like this that fuels the dynamics of research on
Knorr Cetina’s account. These objects of research are seen to be “characteristi-
cally open, question-generating and complex. They are processes and projections
rather than definitive things. Observation and inquiry reveals them by increasing
rather than reducing their complexity.”23 Objects of this sort are what Knorr Cetina
means by epistemic objects, and they are the objects towards which objectual prac-
tices direct themselves.24
21(Heidegger 1927/1962: par. 15:68-70)
22Cf. (Knorr Cetina 2001: 188).
23(Knorr Cetina 2001: 190)
24Occasional difficulties in applying tools or understanding how to make use of equipment are sig-
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Knorr Cetina’s account of objectual practices isn’t aimed at capturing research
inmathematics specifically, but it clearly finds natural application there. For exam-
ple, Radford (2008) and Font et al. (2013) have seen mathematical objects in terms
of the patterns of activity they allow for in practice, and Emily Grosholz has carried
out a book-length study on the roles this type of openness and incompleteness can
play in providing for the “productive ambiguity” involved in the “investigation and
creation” of mathematical objects.25 This suggests that mathematical objects can
be seen as having the features of epistemic objects in Knorr Cetina’s sense. While
her own view seems to be that we should think of epistemic objects themselves,
not just our knowledge of them, as being incomplete and part of an “unfolding
ontology,”26 for present purposes not much seems to hang on whether we accept
this incompleteness as part of the object itself or as stemming from our incomplete
knowledge of the object. If that’s correct, the philosopher of mathematical prac-
tice can accept the phenomenological insights offered by Knorr Cetina’s account
without violating, e.g., the stricture in (Larvor 2001: 218), which claims that we
shouldn’t be taking a stand on ontological issues qua philosophers of mathematical
practice.
The insights gleaned from Knorr Cetina’s work about objectual practices sug-
gest that the import of the incompleteness of (our understanding of) the objects of
research is primarily that these lacks recommend further research questions and,
further, create structures of desires and wantings that can be seen to motivate prac-
nificant for Heidegger’s overall story in Being and Time as well, but for different reasons. These
sorts of problems—a piece of equipment’s conspicuousness (Auffälligkeit), obtrusiveness (Auf-
dringlichkeit), or obstinacy (Aufsässigkeit)—can reveal the otherwise hidden “worldliness of the
world” to us, but they aren’t themselves motivators of further investigations into particular objects
of concern. See (Heidegger 1927/1962: par. 16).
25(Grosholz 2007: 47)
26See (Knorr Cetina 2001: 185). In fact, she goes so far as to use the Sartrean language of the
epistemic object’s being what it isn’t and not being what it is, like the “for-itself” (Sartre 1943/1993:
lxv), at times.
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titioners to conduct the research necessary to at least temporarily satisfy them.27 In
the specific case of mathematical research, these desires and wantings can lead—in
addition to the ordinary pursuit of understanding—to the sorts of conjectures that
push research forward as discussed in, e.g., Mazur (1997). They can also be gen-
erated by presenting and puzzling over “mathematical coincidences” that seem to
defy explanation, as pursued in Davis and Hersh (1981), Baker (2009), and Lange
(2010). A mathematical coincidence presents us with, among other things, an ap-
parent lack of knowledge, and so can naturally be seen as generating an impetus to
increased attention and research.
Seeing mathematics as an epistemic, objectual practice in the sense of Knorr
Cetina also helps to reveal numerous places where the virtues can come to play an
important role in understanding and perhaps even influencing mathematical prac-
tice. Given that the practices of production and maintenance of knowledge seem
to have changed significantly and can be expected to continue to change as our
base of mathematical knowledge grows, more thought will have to be given to vir-
tuous forms of these practices. For example, in the past two years (2018-2019),
63% of the papers published in Annals of Mathematics have more than one au-
thor. From 1990-1991, the number was 39%; 23% from 1962-1963; and 13% from
1934-1935. Clearly, it appears as if the generation of mathematical knowledge is
becoming more and more cooperative. It’s perhaps even possible to view mathe-
matical researchers as being more and more enmeshed in the machinery of knowl-
edge construction within their particular fields, where the production of knowledge
is governed more by collective projects and goals than by single actors pursuing
individual knowledge or understanding.28 Proofs, such as the proof of the classifi-
cation of finite simple groups, are also becoming of almost unmanageable length,
again requiring cooperation in both their production and verification. How can
these facts of mathematical practice be accommodated and managed in the best
27(Knorr Cetina 2001: 194)
28See (Knorr Cetina 1999: 11) for an account of science in general along these lines.
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way? Focusing on the virtues that foster the practice of open and shared coopera-
tive research in the course of mathematical training might be an important choice
for the discipline to commit to. Questions about the appropriate maintenance of
and availability of access to mathematical knowledge bases can also be usefully
raised here.
These kinds of questions aren’t strictly for philosophers to answer of course.
When a field faces problems and questions like the ones raised by the changing
facts of research and knowledge production in mathematics, it’s generally to be
expected that the field itself will be forced to work out a solution (or solutions)
in order to progress.29 However, significant work attempting to address these and
similar questions in fields like engineering and medical ethics has already been
done, and this work can find application in mathematics well. Students enter-
ing engineering or medical fields are generally required to have some kind of ba-
sic training in ethics,30 perhaps something similar is becoming reasonable in the
case of mathematical training. Discussion of professional virtues is also becom-
ing more important for mathematicians to consider given the importance of the
roles of mathematicians in the world of finance, security, and the military. The
characterization of mathematical research objects as generating desires and wants
that motivate exploration also naturally (and a bit more fancifully) raises questions
about virtuous means for satisfying those desires. Alfréd Rényi is supposed to
have said that a mathematician is a device for turning coffee into theorems. We
might want to ask ourselves whether this presents us with a picture of a flourishing
29E.g., one of the motivations for active research into computer-verified proofs, say, using Coq,
Mizar, or Isabelle, is both to check long, complicated proofs and to provide an easily accessible
store of mathematical results.
30Thinking in terms of the virtues seems to be becoming more prevalent in these fields in recent
years as well. For example, the most recent edition of Engineering Ethics: Concepts and Cases
Harris et al. (2019), one of the most widely-used textbooks on the subject, has now added sections
incorporating virtue ethics into the tools it hopes to provide its readers.
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human life.31 If so, in what sense? If not, what might be missing? How can an an-
swer to this kind of question even be approached? In the next section, I’ll outline a
framework for thinking about the virtues in relation to mathematical practice that
aims to provide some tools for settling questions of this sort.
4 AMacIntyreanFramework forMathematical Virtues
Having finished presenting a very general characterization of some of the objects
and goals of mathematical practice, I’ll proceed to offer a framework within which
thinking about the virtues in connection with the pursuit of these goals can be
fruitfully undertaken. The framework takes its main inspiration from the ideas of
MacIntyre.
4.1 Recapitulation of MacIntyre’s Account in Ethics
MacIntyre offers an account of the virtues after having taken three preliminary
steps. First, he offers a characterization of practices; then he suggests the need for
a conception of the narrative structure of a single human life and its goods to sup-
plement and structure this initial understanding of practices; finally, he considers
the role of a “moral tradition” in providing the context within which to make sense
of both practices and the ends of a human life in general. For a trainable charac-
teristic to be a virtue, it must be a trait that helps one achieve the internal goods of
practices as well as sustain a general aim for the goods achievable over the course
of a human life within a moral tradition that it also helps to nurture and advance.
MacIntyre’s account of a practice has already been discussed, and in the course
of that discussion, I noted that the first test a character trait must pass in order to
be counted as a virtue is whether or not it contributes to the achievement of goods
31Cf. Jones (2006) and (Su 2020: Ch. 1) for more on the cultivation of virtue through mathematics.
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internal to these practices. If it does, it is at least potentially a virtue.32 Since there
are practices and virtues that compete with one another however, e.g., perhaps bal-
let and bodybuilding, MacIntyre further suggests that we need additional structure
to help guide our pursuit of one practice and its virtues over another. This struc-
turing should be provided, he suggests, by a picture of the good life for a human
being.
The good life for man is the life spent in seeking for the good life for
man, and the virtues necessary for the seeking are those which will
enable us to understand what more and what else the good life for
man is (MacIntyre 1981: 219, emphasis added).
The virtues therefore are to be understood as those dispositions which
will not only sustain practices and enable us to achieve the goods in-
ternal to practices, but which will also sustain us in the relevant kind
of quest for the good, by enabling us to overcome the harms, dangers,
temptations and distractions which we encounter, and which will fur-
nish us with increasing self-knowledge and increasing knowledge of
the good (MacIntyre 1981: 219).
The main role this conception of the good life plays in MacIntyre’s thinking about
the virtues, again, is helping us settle questions about which incompatible practices
to devote ourselves to and about the relative importance of practices that can be
pursued simultaneously. But given the variability of the ways in which people have
conceived of “the good life for man” and the ways in which we can understandwhat
this kind of life requires, it’s still not clear that accepting a human telos alone can
do the settling required. For example, one who views the good life along the lines
of the life lived by the monk and one who views it along the lines of that of the
soldier will likely structure their dedication to various practices quite differently,
and so would also not agree on the characteristics that should be deemed virtuous
32(MacIntyre 1981: 191)
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and those that should be seen as vicious.33 The third part of MacIntyre’s account
aims at adjudicating this kind of disagreement.
The final part of the MacIntyrean story that allows us to give a definition of the
virtues is the concept of a moral tradition (or a “tradition of inquiry” as it’s called
in Whose Justice? Which Rationality? 34). MacIntyre’s idea here is that one can’t
pursue or expect to justify answers to the question of what the good life for human
beings is all alone. And he claims, further, that, in order to judge accounts of the
good life, we need the establishment of historically located standards for what is to
count as an adequate answer—standards that only emerge in the course of a tradi-
tion of inquiry defining and developing them.35,36 MacIntyre’s notion of a tradition
of inquiry that does this supporting and establishingwork is roughly some common
undertaking that’s partly constituted by the arguments over what the undertaking
itself should look like and what it should care about. A tradition is a “continuity of
conflict” as he puts it in After Virtue;37 a “historically extended, socially embodied
argument, and an argument precisely in part about the goods which constitute that
tradition.”38 A moral tradition is in the business of seeking and justifying answers
to the question of what is “the good and the best” kind of life human beings like us
can lead.39 The justification of one tradition’s answers to these questions necessar-
ily involves comparing traditions insofar as they can answer other questions such
as, “What resources does our particular tradition afford in this situation? Can we
by means of those resources understand the achievements and successes, and the
failures and sterilities, of rival traditions more adequately than their own adher-
33Cf. (MacIntyre 1981: 64).
34MacIntyre (1988)
35Making this case is one of the main goals of MacIntyre (1988).
36Moral traditions are also supposed to do some of thework of justifying something thatmight seem




39(MacIntyre 1981: 275, emphasis in the original)
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ents can? More adequately by our standards? More adequately also by theirs?”40
It’s only in confrontations like these that traditions as a whole can justify their an-
swers to questions about the good/flourishing life, and through such confrontations
MacIntyre hopes to show how traditions make progress towards reaching a more
complete understanding of the virtues as well.
A virtue on MacIntyre’s account can now be defined to be a trainable human
quality that allows one to achieve the goods internal to practices and that helps one
succeed in the pursuit of the good of a whole human life and that enables one to
contribute to the maintenance and advancement of a tradition of inquiry.
4.2 Tailoring the Account to Mathematics
Although MacIntyre’s account of virtue based on his understanding of practices,
the structure of a human life, and the context of a moral tradition is formulated to
deal primarily with ethical excellences, it very naturally can be adjusted to provide
a framework for thinking about the wide variety of pursuits and excellences within
mathematics and its practice. In fact, one of the most common objections to Mac-
Intyre’s line of thinking in virtue ethics (i.e., that there isn’t a common good that
we can take human life in general to aim at) looks like it becomes far less urgent
when the expansive account is trimmed down to apply to a complex and varied,
but not all-encompassing, stretch of human life such as mathematics. Obviously,
it’s not at all clear that there is or could be one overarching good at which math-
ematics aims, but that the conversation taking place between those pursuing the
subject regarding what its goals are and should be could at least be hoped to reach
something like agreement on this matter seems to be an easier hope to maintain.41
40(MacIntyre 1988: 402)
41See (Corfield 2012: 250-255) for an interesting attempt, also within a broadly MacIntyrean set-
ting, to show that “perfected understanding” of mathematical objects is the overarching telos of
mathematical research. See also Avigad (2008) on the general aim of understanding in mathemat-
ics.
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In order to have a framework for extracting virtues from mathematical practice
that takes inspiration from MacIntyre’s account above, we’ll need something to
play the role of each of the three background parts of that account. In place of
practices in general, we can consider, e.g., the activities undertaken by fields and
subfields as a whole; those of communities organized around a particular problem
or problems; and the tasks of teaching, mentoring, researching, organizing or re-
organizing, and popularizing. Instead of thinking about the good life for human
beings in general, we might focus on the good life or career of a mathematician,
or the good life or career of a particular type of mathematician. And, finally, the
analogue of a moral tradition within mathematical practice might be taken to be
something like those who take proof to require constructive methods, or those who
aim to have all theorems be, in theory, formalizable within ZFC or some form of
type theory, or we could even consider the tradition of mathematics in, say, France
as compared to Germany or Japan. Each of these aspects of mathematical life is
embedded in human life more generally, so if MacIntyre’s more general account
of the virtues is correct, we can’t separate the virtues of mathematics or mathe-
maticians completely from general human virtues. Nevertheless, focusing on an
account of the virtues qua mathematical by means of this general framework ap-
pears to bear fruit straightaway.
The first nice feature of this framework applied to mathematics is that it pro-
vides a convenient means of connecting the virtues of the mathematical practi-
tioner and the virtues of the mathematical product by way of an account of the
ongoing development of our understanding of the ends of various aspects of math-
ematical practice. A characteristic can be taken to be a virtue if it contributes to
excellent achievement of the goods internal to, e.g., an area of the subject, while
also contributing to the overall development of one sort of mathematician’s life
and mathematical tradition, where the goods, excellences, and good life are all un-
derstood according to that tradition’s current best understanding of each of these.
Conversely, a quality of a proof or definition or conjecture can be seen to be a virtue
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if it is something that’s aimed at by the mathematical practitioner in her practice,
career, or tradition according to the best current understanding of the ends of each
of these within the tradition.
Next, the framework, by incorporating both local and global views of math-
ematical practice allows for investigations into one aspect of the overall practice
to naturally reflect back on others. Consider first what might be learned by exam-
ining the local practices of, say, graph theorists, or those working in differential
equations, or those involved in pursuing the Langlands program. In any given lo-
cal practice, we’ll expect to find some set of internal goods that may be specific
or specifically valuable to that practice; e.g., solving interesting data-optimization
problems, finding some piece of mathematics applicable to real-world problems,
or finding some unifying connection across disparate subfields. The goods con-
nected with some of these fields might group together naturally or not at all and
so suggest different versions of what the good mathematician looks like and sub-
sequently what the good mathematical life or career should be understood to be.
These characteristics and understandings might then lead to the discovery of un-
dercurrents of different traditions or conflicts within a tradition that could then
be further brought out and clarified in ways that further discussions of the goals
of the tradition or suggest the consideration of taking a new path. Attempting to
come to an understanding of the virtues of mathematical practice or mathematical
practitioners even quite locally could, therefore, lead directly to a deeper global
understanding of the field.
The aim of conceptualizing stretches of mathematical practice as structured by
what we consider to be the goodmathematical career or life similarly allows for the
raising of questions not commonly asked within the philosophy of mathematical
practice: e.g., what makes a mathematical career a good and virtuous one? what
are the goals appropriate to a mathematician at various stages in her development?
G.H. Hardy had the controversial view that “[y]oung men should prove theorems,
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old men should write books,”42 which there may be no real reason to accept, but
that doesn’t mean that different forms of mentorship, professional engagement, and
so on might not be more or less virtuous at different points in a mathematician’s
life.43 These are not questions for philosophers to simply rule on obviously. But
encouraging and engaging in the discussions in this area and the other areas that the
MacIntyrean framework presented above suggest for investigation could perhaps
lead to renewed relevance of philosophy of mathematics to mathematics itself: if
we together find a picture of a good mathematical life or career within a tradition
to be one that we judge to be unacceptable for one reason or another, we may aim
to fix this by making changes to what’s considered an excellence relative to the
practice or tradition as a whole.
Finally, in relation to the interaction of local and global views, taking the most
global perspective encouraged by MacIntyre’s inclusion of the concerns of a tradi-
tion within his account of the virtues allows us to ask and try to answer questions
about what makes one approach to the subject as a whole or in part thrive when
another fails to do so. E.g., not everyone shares the concerns of Voevodsky (n.d.)
about the need for formally verified proofs, but everyone can get excited about the
new mathematics and applications of computer-assisted proofs that are under in-
vestigation in the univalent foundations program.44 This excitement is leading to
renewed interest in type theory, and with it constructive mathematics more gener-
ally. How this is affecting mathematical practice as a whole is surely a question
worth pursuing. If something like the MacIntyrean framework for understanding
the virtues in the setting of mathematical practice presented here is on the right
track, we should expect practitioners within the Voevodsky program and those
outside of it to be considering the very questions MacIntyre suggests people in
differing moral traditions should be considering when confronting one another:
42(Albers and Dyson 1994: 4)
43See, again, Jones (2006) for historical discussion of the question of howmathematics can develop
a person’s individual virtues.
44See Grayson (2018) for an introduction.
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“What resources does our particular tradition afford in this situation? Can we by
means of those resources understand the achievements and successes, and the fail-
ures and sterilities, of rival traditions more adequately than their own adherents
can? More adequately by our standards? More adequately also by theirs?”45,46
Answers to these questions can clearly impact both the more local practices of dif-
ferent areas of the subject as well as views about the good mathematical life more
broadly.
I’ll consider one final advantage ofworkingwithin aMacIntyre-inspired frame-
work when attempting to understand the virtues in mathematics, as well as a ma-
jor objection to the view, before I move on to outline a methodology for pursuing
the actual cataloguing of virtues within mathematical practice in Section 5. The
advantage involves the fact that the framework is explicitly and self-consciously
historical. The objection is that the view is hopelessly naïve about there being such
a thing as the good mathematical life or career or a telos of the subject. I’ll begin
by considering the claimed-advantage first.
There are debates within mathematics about, for example, the use of different
foundations or logics, which can seem to be decidable using reason alone or to
not have a real effect on most of the ordinary practice of the subject. But there
are also changes that affect everyone in the field regardless of their commitments,
and these changes require some acknowledgement and incorporation into an un-
derstanding of the practice’s state; e.g., pure mathematics is more influenced by
physics now than it seems to have been previously; and research institutes are hous-
ing more mathematicians than ever before.47 This sort of fact is bound to have ef-
fects within the field itself and should be part of what “practice-first” philosophers
of mathematics investigate. The proper way to integrate these new realities will
likely require a good deal of thinking about which qualities of mathematical life
45(MacIntyre 1988: 402)
46Cf. MacIntyre (2006). See also (Corfield 2012: §5) for rich discussion of how conflicts between
mathematical traditions might be settled from a MacIntyrean perspective.
47See National Research Council (2013) for more along these lines.
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and research are worth maintaining and which can be altered without too much
loss when conflicts inevitably arise. By beginning with a historically-located un-
derstanding of mathematical practice and mathematical virtues, the shift to think-
ing about these more concrete historical realities is less abrupt than it would be if
we began from a more isolated account of our subject.
The objection I’d like to consider next runs as follows. MacIntyre’s framework
applied to mathematics suffers from the same problem it suffers from more gener-
ally: it relies on a picture of the good life and the good itself when there just isn’t
any such thing to appeal to. That is, how could there be such a thing as the telos
of mathematical practice itself or the good mathematical life overall? The subject
is far too varied for there to be one end pursued, and it’s not even clear that the
characteristics and achievements that might make a mathematician successful in
achieving particular goods are the same for one person as they travel from room to
room in their department, let alone as they traverse a whole career or lifetime.
A full response to this objection would require a full defense of an understand-
ing of inquiry and rationality as founded on the workings of a tradition.48 Never-
theless, the role of tradition in providing the means for responding to the objection
can, I hope, be made plausible and palatable enough in outline that the overall
approach to the virtues provided by a MacIntyrean account can be accepted in-
dependently of one’s views about MacIntyre’s longer story about justification and
reason.
One important role for tradition in this MacIntyrean framework for the virtues
is to help stabilize what we might expect to be the wildly varying opinions about
the goods of various forms of mathematical practices and living. By attempting to
give an account of how these goods and life projects fit into a picture of the good
as currently best understood within a given tradition, one is forced to go beyond
48For MacIntyre’s own attempts to justify his version of the claims of tradition-based inquiry, see,
e.g., MacIntyre (1988), MacIntyre (1990), and most recently MacIntyre (2016). For more on the
approach applied to mathematics, see again Corfield (2012).
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what could, without further reflection, be seen as nothing but subjective prejudice.
Of course, a mathematician may not spend much time thinking about how to jus-
tify her value judgments from within her tradition. But to be genuinely part of a
tradition is to take these sorts of questions at least somewhat seriously. Likewise,
anyone working with a tradition of any sort would be expected to confront inco-
herence internal to the system they work with; to accommodate new discoveries or
ideas; to respond to objections from other traditions or schools of thought internal
to the tradition; and so on.49 If it’s justifiable to think of the working mathemati-
cian as being part of some tradition of inquiry and if attempting to fit one’s personal
values and the values of the various mathematical practices one engages in into a
form that can be justified from the perspective of one’s location within something
like a mathematical tradition can have a stabilizing effect—and it seems to be the
case that both of these are plausibly the case—then the extreme variation posited
by the objection can be mitigated to some degree. This mitigation makes it possi-
ble for inquiry into the virtues within a MacIntyrean framework to proceed in the
worst case by acting as if there were objective goods at which to aim. This starting
point is enough to still allow the framework to provide guidance and structure for
our study of the virtues within mathematics.
5 Viewing Mathematical Practice Realistically
Having now characterized mathematical practice as an epistemic, objectual prac-
tice in the sense of Knorr Cetina and provided a MacIntyrean framework for inves-
tigating virtue-based aspects of the practice, I’ll further suggest several method-
ological principles that should be employed in the actual investigation of the prac-
tice within this framework.50 The methodological position I’ll be advocating is
49(MacIntyre 2016: 206)
50(Rittberg 2019: 13) provides a long list of possible methodologies for pursuing the study of
mathematical practice. The approach advocated here is closest to the one mentioned from Larvor
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most naturally called “realist,” but it warrants this label simply by being realist in
the everyday, non-philosophical sense of the word. In order to avoid the confusion
of this ordinary realism with its more familiar philosophically and metaphysically
realist competitors, I’ll instead refer to the methodological principles discussed in
this section as being “realistic.” I contend that this is the only kind of realism that
philosophers of mathematics have any need to subscribe to. Having provided a
more complex view of the practice of mathematics, a framework within which to
consider this practice’s virtues, and a methodology with which to pursue the study
of concrete virtues within the practice, I’ll claim that the prolegomena to virtue-
theoretic studies in the philosophy of mathematics planned to be undertaken here
are completed.
In philosophical work, the most familiar advocates of a realistic methodology
of the type to be described in this section have pursued practical questions in legal
and political philosophy. In Philosophy and Real Politics, for instance, Raymond
Geuss expounds a realistic methodology that enjoins the political philosopher to
inquire into political thought and action with the aim of discounting illusory moti-
vations and goals by ignoring idealizations and rational reconstructions. Instead,
he urges political philosophers to study the concrete realities that have actually
motivated real human actors as they have pursued their definite social and political
goals. Geuss’s realist offers the guidance, “Don’t look just at what they say, think,
believe, but at what they actually do, and what actually happens as a result.”51 By
investigating real actions rather than the principles that purport to motivate and
justify these actions, the realistic philosopher strives to strip away whatever ob-
fuscation and ideology they can in order to get at the real mechanics of power and
(2010), but it’s not my intention to rule out any of the alternatives. Rather, the methodology to be
considered simply suggests ways of thinking about the various objects of study focused on by these
other approaches. I should note also that the approach doesn’t fit very naturally into the catalogue
of (Van Bendegem 2014: 221).
51See (Geuss 2008: 10, emphasis in the original). This kind of thinking is also prominent in the
work of Max Weber; see, e.g., (Weber 1968: Part 2, Ch. X).
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legitimacy in the realm of politics. This is a paradigm case of taking a realist’s
approach to a subject—realist, in the ordinary sense of the word.52
Contemporary philosophy of mathematics has rightly moved in the direction
of attempting to pay closer attention to the ordinary practice of mathematics. This
trend may suggest that the subject has also already accepted a realistic method-
ology of the sort just indicated. This has not really been the case, however. Too
much weight is still placed on the psychology of mathematicians and the analy-
sis of philosophical offerings found lurking around a mathematician’s proofs or
tucked away in her prefaces. There remains, therefore, a need within the field for
the adoption of a methodology that is realistic in a sense analogous to the ones em-
ployed in some of the more familiar arenas of realistic thought discussed above.
At any rate, the primary goal of this section is to make the case for the usefulness
of this methodological position.
The philosopher who has previously been most adamant about practicing the
kind of ordinary realism to be advocated here when thinking about mathematics
is (the later) Wittgenstein.53 I’ll, therefore, look to Wittgenstein for inspiration as
I outline the main tenets of the realistic methodology for examining mathematical
practice within the framework I’m proposing. The following two subsections will
introduce what I take to be two of the most important of Wittgenstein’s insights
and then expand on how they might be employed in the study of mathematical
practice. I’ll also suggest how these methods can be used to help avoid a mistake
it might otherwise be easy to make when trying to come to an understanding of
mathematicians’ own conception of mathematical virtues.
Before moving on to this discussion, however, I should pause to note the seem-
ing oddness of pairing Wittgenstein’s thought with what’s come before. For ex-
52The American legal realists can be seen as being realistic in a similar way. See, for example,
(Leiter 2005: 50-53).
53Cf. (Wittgenstein 1939/1989: 55, 103). It remains a matter of controversy, however, whether
Wittgenstein really wanted nothing more than for us to look at the workings of mathematics “from
close to” (Wittgenstein 1953/2009: §51, emphasis in the original).
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ample, my account of mathematical practice as objectual seems to be opposed to
Wittgenstein’s thinking about mathematics, which is often presented as being anti-
realist.54 Further, a full MacIntyrean account of the mathematical virtues would
proceed methodically towards objective goods through careful rational reconstruc-
tion of practice and tradition, while Wittgenstein seems most concerned with how
to go on quickly in the short run and doesn’t think that there are objective truths
about the world of mathematics to mirror in our understanding of mathematical
practice.
While it’s true that Wittgenstein is often associated with a form of anti-realism
and would likely not find MacIntyre’s method for justifying a particular good as
the good appealing, this association and fact are ultimately orthogonal to the role
Wittgenstein’s ideas will play in the methodological account to be presented in
this section. That is, it’s perfectly possible to take mathematics to be about objects
or not, while still employing a realistic methodology inspired by Wittgenstein to
investigate an objectual practice. Similarly, while the MacIntyrean framework for
investigating the virtues does require a quality to contribute to the maintenance
of tradition for it to count as a virtue, the inquiry into which qualities are most
prominent within a given practice and which do this kind of contributing can be
carried out using a methodology inspired by Wittgenstein regardless of whether
or not Wittgenstein himself would find contribution to the maintenance of a math-
ematical tradition to be something worth caring about. The best recent work on
Wittgenstein’s writings in the philosophy of mathematics has in fact moved away
from trying to categorize him as an advocate of any particular “-ism” and has in-
stead emphasized the realistic methodology in the sense to be explained often on
display in his writings.55 It’s within this recent trend in Wittgenstein scholarship
that the appeal to Wittgenstein’s thought in this paper should be situated. Being
situated within the context of this trend makes the conclusions Wittgenstein him-
54See, e.g., (Dummett 1959: 348) for the classic interpretation of this kind.
55See in particular the work of Juliet Floyd and Felix Mühlhölzer in the bibliography.
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self might’ve reached using his methods, which I’m not aiming to defend here,
largely unimportant. With these preliminary worries addressed, then, I’ll move on
to outlining the realistic methodology I’m recommending.
5.1 “If you want to know what has been proved, look at the
proof.”56
One of Wittgenstein’s most well-known pieces of advice for taking a realistic view
of mathematics and mathematical practice is to take care to distinguish between
prose and proof when reading mathematical writing. He suggests that mathemat-
ics expressed in prose is more likely to be misleading or to be used in the service
of suspect metaphysical projects—and he thinks this to be true of any prose inter-
pretation. Wittgenstein’s suggestion, “If you want to know what has been proved,
look at the proof,” is the most straightforward way to try to act on any skepticism
about prose in mathematical writing. However, the suggestion calls for expansion
and modification since it’s not at all clear how to act on in practice it and since
it looks like it commits one to a kind of “proof chauvinism” that could lead to
the overlooking of many important and interesting aspects mathematical practice
relevant to the virtues.57 The goal of only addressing misleading prose and not ac-
tual mathematics makes the question of how the two can be clearly distinguished
a pressing one. Many interpreters of Wittgenstein’s work have found drawing the
distinction to be no simple matter, and for good reason.58 It is, however, important
to note before moving on that prose and proof can’t be separated as easily as by
looking for one outside and the other inside of a “Proof: … Q.E.D.”-pair.
One way of expanding on this first insight of Wittgenstein’s when trying to
56See (Wittgenstein 1939/1989: 39). It’s interesting to note thatWittgenstein immediately qualifies
this claim, calling it an exaggeration and saying that it’s partly true and partly false.
57The term ‘proof chauvinism’ comes from D’Alessandro (2018), which argues that not every
mathematical explanation is a proof. Lange (2017) addresses this topic as well.
58 See, e.g., Floyd (2001) and (Kienzler and Grève 2016: 81).
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understand the virtues of a mathematical product and of acting on a skepticism
about prose interpretations of mathematical results can perhaps be brought out
most clearly by considering an analogy with the investigations of reverse mathe-
matics. Reverse mathematics is a subfield of mathematical logic initiated by the
work of Harvey Friedman in the 1970s that takes as one of its main goals the de-
termination of minimal axiom systems required to prove standard mathematical
theorems.59 An axiom system is taken to be of the minimal strength required to
prove a theorem if (i) the theorem can be proved from the axioms (over a weak
base logic) and (ii) the axioms can be proved from the assumption of the theorem
as well. The proof involved in demonstrating (ii) is where the ‘reverse’ comes
from in the name: there’s a sense in which we’re going backwards if we start from
a theorem and use it to prove an axiom. By finding the minimal setting in which
a given theorem can be proven, we can hope to get some sense of that theorem’s
real strength or content. Similarly, by making minimal philosophical assumptions
about the correct way to think about a mathematical object or theorem, it may be
possible to find the minimal thing or things that must be said in order to compre-
hend that mathematical object or construction or to make sense of that particular
result. The claims that look like they can’t be denied can at least be hoped to be
free from the sorts of problems endemic to other more elaborate prose interpreta-
tions, and could arguably be considered to contain the real mathematical content
involved in a given case.60 The attempt to isolate something approaching the real
mathematical content of the item of interest should be seen as the necessary first
step towards understanding its mathematically virtuous features.
According to Wittgenstein, a realistic look at mathematics will reveal that
59See, e.g., Friedman (1975) and Simpson (1999), which is the standard reference.
60The attempt to minimize philosophical background assumptions also helps to make room for
the “pluralism in perspectives” suggested by Michelle Friend, another author that can be seen as
attempting to find the best way to be realistic when philosophizing about mathematics. See (Friend
2014: 25).
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“mathematics is a MULTICOLOURED mixture.”61 On one way of understanding it,
this “mixture”-perspective of mathematics is almost a truism. We clearly do use
different proof methods with differing frequencies when doing, say, combinatorics
as compared to real analysis or algebra or set theory. Working with categories ver-
sus sets or the rationals versus the reals can feel like working with significantly
different species of mathematical object. And when we look at the “normal sci-
ence” of mathematics, we undeniably see different goals and methods, and this fact
should be taken seriously as we approach the subject from a philosophical angle.
So, for example, number theory is out to investigate a potentially in-
finite sequence; algebra is in the business of identifying and study-
ing structural features shared by many mathematical objects; analysis
grew out of scientific applications and focuses on real number spaces
and their generalizations; at least one aim of set theory is to provide
a certain kind of foundation for classical mathematics. Each of these
endeavors involves different methods, different ways of thinking, and
these appear to be differences ‘in the math’ (Ernst et al. 2015: 159).62
Despite these points in its favor, however, this claim of Wittgenstein’s is often
taken to be one of his most controversial mathematical remarks. Philosophers and
mathematicians alike have taken exception to this line of thought, perhaps because
they have taken him to be denying some kind of underlying unity of the subject.
John Burgess, for example, explicitly argues that “[m]athematics is no motley.”63
And the Fields medalist Jean-Pierre Serre exemplifies a common conception of the
61This is Felix Mühlhölzer’s translation of the passage more familiarly rendered as “Mathematics
is a motley” (Wittgenstein 1956/1983: III §46). Mühlhölzer argues that the term ‘motley’ has
negative connotations that don’t fit well with the general thrust of Wittgenstein’s remarks about the
mixture of proof methods found in mathematics. I use his translation of this remark to signal my
agreement on this point. See, however, (Hacking 2014: 57) for a contrary view.
62Cf. (Ferreirós 2016: 37).
63(Burgess 2015: 60)
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unity of mathematics when he states that many important mathematical questions
“are not group theory, nor topology, nor number theory: They are just mathemat-
ics.”64
This natural objection to Wittgenstein illustrates clearly the value of taking a
realistic perspective when thinking about mathematical practice, especially when
the various values and goods of different practices are in question. To say that
mathematics is a patchwork of proof methods and systems isn’t to deny that there
are connections and similarities of methods and questions to be found all over the
subject, often in surprising places. Nor is it to deny that some of themost important
and deep problems of contemporary research can’t be nicely separated into group
theory or analysis or topology alone. In fact, one of the things that most interests
Wittgenstein about mathematics—and that inevitably interests anyone acquainted
with the subject at all—is the myriad and unexpected ways in which what may
be (or may appear to be) different areas of mathematics come to be linked to-
gether and integrated over time.65 Wittgenstein himself often makes the further
claim that these links and connections are created rather than discovered,66 and
this does imply that there isn’t a pre-established world of mathematics revealed
by mathematical research. In my estimation, it’s this further claim that most ran-
kles when it comes to this topic. The further, stronger claim is suggested, not just
by Wittgenstein, but by the tenet of the realistic methodology on offer here that
tries to make minimal philosophical assumptions whenever possible, but it’s not
required or something that must be enforced for those who wish to take a realistic
view of the subject. In particular, one need not make such a strong further claim
when being guided by the thought that viewing mathematics realistically reveals a
multicolored mixture of proof methods and practices whose different perspectives
64(Serre et al. 1999: 35)
65See, e.g., (Wittgenstein 1956/1983: I §166): “What, then—does [mathematics] just twist and
turn within these rules?—It forms ever new rules: is always building new roads for traffic; by
extending the network of the old ones.” See also (Wittgenstein 1956/1983: III §31).
66E.g., (Wittgenstein 1930/1975: §158) and (Wittgenstein 1956/1983: I §168).
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on the mathematical virtues must be respected if we’re to obtain an adequate view
of the subject.
5.2 “[I]f we had to name anything which is the life of the sign,
we should have to say it was its use.”67
Wittgenstein characterizes Frege as claiming that, if the formalists are correct that
“[a]rithmetic is concerned only with the rules governing the manipulation of the
arithmetical signs, not, however, with the reference of the signs,”68 the signs used
in mathematics “would be dead and utterly uninteresting, whereas they obviously
have a kind of life.”69 He returns to the metaphor of live and dead signs often in his
writings. For example, the following exchange in the Investigations again connects
the idea of a living sign with the concept of use: “Every sign by itself seems
dead. What gives it life?—In use it is alive.”70 The second major imperative of
the realistic methodology being advocated in this section is to aim to always view
mathematical practice in its live, rather than dead, form.
The importance of use in bringing mathematical expressions to life according
toWittgenstein’s picture of meaning can be brought out by way of the claim that we
often get ourselves into philosophical tangles when we view language apart from
its use—when language goes “on holiday.”71 Wittgenstein suggests that we often
find questions about the meaning of specific words or propositions taken out of
context difficult or impossible to answer, but, when live and in use, any hesitation
about what a word or phrase means for the most part seems to vanish instantly.
This is evidently the basic point of the following passage.
67(Wittgenstein 1935/1958: 4, emphasis in the original)
68See (Frege 1903/1960: §88). This is Frege’s way of restating the views of E. Heine and
J. Thomae.
69(Wittgenstein 1935/1958: 4)
70(Wittgenstein 1953/2009: §432, emphasis in the original)
71 (Wittgenstein 1953/2009: §38)
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If I am drowning and I shout “Help!”, how do I know what the word
Help means? Well, that’s how I react in this situation. —Now that is
how I know what “green” means as well and also know how I have
to follow the rule in the particular case (Wittgenstein 1956/1983: VI
§35, emphasis in the original).
Wittgenstein’s general hope is that many, if not all, of our philosophical difficul-
ties can be resolved if we can “bring words back from their metaphysical to their
everyday use” where they function without fault.72,73 For the purposes of this pa-
per, the resolution of philosophical difficulties is of less concern than the hope that
by restricting our observation of mathematics and its practice to times when signs
and techniques are in use, we’ll have a more accurate picture of the true values and
virtues in play.
The general principle of allowing the meaning of a term or proposition to be
illuminated by how it’s used is clear enough and one that seems to have already
appeared broadly plausible to mathematicians and philosophers of mathematics.
For example, William Thurston, another Fields medalist reflecting on his subject,
suggests that the language of mathematics “is not alive except to those who use
it,”74 and Stewart Shapiro and Hilary Putnam both subscribe to a “Use Thesis”
that is Wittgensteinian in content.75 However, there are still a few points worth
emphasizing about this tenet of the realistic methodology before moving on to a
brief illustration of its usefulness.
The first thing to notice is the fact that the languages of mathematics aren’t al-
ways used like ordinary languages are, so there may be some question about what
72(Wittgenstein 1953/2009: §116)
73What exactly ‘metaphysical’ is supposed to mean in this statement is the matter of a debate that
needn’t be settled here. For the record, I’m roughly in agreement with Gordon Baker, who suggests
that metaphysical uses try to express essences or to pass themselves off as being scientific but are
not. Cf. (Baker 2009: 96-100).
74(Thurston 2006: 167)
75See (Shapiro 1991: 212) and Putnam (1980).
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this kind of language’s being in use is supposed to look like. This is a reasonable
concern, but some ground can be gained towards understanding mathematical lan-
guage in use by employing the via negativa.
When doing ordinary mathematics and logic, giving an “interpretation” of a
language means setting up a map between the symbols of the language and some
appropriate mathematical structure. Given this way of thinking about interpre-
tations, it’s easy to think that questions about meaning and reference can be in-
vestigated using these simple model-theoretic methods. However, as Mühlhölzer
(2014) rightly points out, when we give an interpretation, we precisely aren’t using
the language in question—we’re instead constructing a further mathematical ob-
ject. If that’s correct and if meaning essentially has to do with use as Wittgenstein
believes, then this kind of construction has nothing at all to do with meaning. One
way to focus on the importance of use in observing mathematical practice, then, is
to be careful not to allow talk of interpretations in the model-theoretic sense to be
uncritically used to settle questions about meaning and other closely related issues.
More generally, it may be easier to tell when a language is not being used than to
give a full account of what exactly being in use requires or entails. Fortunately, in
many cases this is enough.
Secondly, it’s worth remembering that not every question about use needs to
be put simply in terms of whether or not a sign or expression is being used. We can
also ask about how these linguistic items are put to use. For example, perhaps upon
close examination, the axioms that define a particular area of inquiry look as if they
function like rules for the use of the terms involved, as is concluded in Friederich
(2011). Maybe certain theorems appear to function in this way aswell when they’re
put to use. For example, the Bolzano-Weierstraß theorem states that any bounded
sequence in ℝn has a convergent subsequence. This theorem is often used like a
rule that licenses one to conclude that such a convergent subsequence is already
in hand. If we pay close attention to the ways in which theorems, lemmas, and
axioms are put to use in ordinary circumstances, we should be able to command a
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clearer view of the subject and its practices, again even without a fully worked out
theory of mathematical use.
Consider the following example of how this part of the realistic methodol-
ogy being advocated can be put to good use. One of the pressing questions the
philosophy of mathematical practice must answer is, “What is the real extent of
agreement among mathematicians within the practice?” Appeals to “mathemati-
cal practice” make it seem as if there is some kind of monolithic consensus being
relied on, but so far this consensus has largely been simply assumed. In a pair of
useful publications, Matthew Inglis and Andrew Aberdein have attempted to pro-
vide some empirical data relating to this question.76 Inglis and Aberdein (2016)
selected a proof from Aigner and Ziegler (2000) and asked 53 research mathe-
maticians from Australia, Canada, and New Zealand to determine (on a 5-point
scale) how well twenty adjectives like ‘ingenious’, ‘difficult’, ‘shallow’, ‘rigorous’,
and ‘informative’ applied to the proof. They interestingly found that four broad
dimensions—aesthetics, intricacy, precision, and utility—could in linear combi-
nation approximate many of the adjectives they used; e.g., “proofs were likely to
be rated as explanatory if they were useful, precise and non-intricate.”77 They also
found “a remarkable level of disagreement” between the participants’ evaluations
of the proof. What should we make of this disagreement?
Someone accepting a realistic methodology of the sort advocated in this sec-
tion would suggest that we should be very wary of inferring anything at all from
these data. Why? First, if a realist is someone who looks “not at what they say,
but at what they do,” a mathematician’s using a particular adjective to describe a
proof on its own shouldn’t lead a realist to conclude that, say, a particular proof is
explanatory. Instead, the advocate of a realistic methodology would prefer to find
cases where a mathematician was asked for an explanation of some fact and pre-
sented a proof as explanatory in that context. She’d further only take the fact that
76Inglis and Aberdein (2015), Inglis and Aberdein (2016)
77(Inglis and Aberdein 2016: 168)
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this proof was presented as explanatory to reveal that the proof is explanatory in
this context rather than explanatory tout court. Second, and this worry is related
to the first, asking a mathematician to evaluate a proof on a questionnaire looks
like a paradigm case of investigating language “on holiday.” It’s asking what Baz
(2012) calls “the theorist’s question”: does our concept of x apply to some real or
imaginary case. If our aim is to investigate mathematical practice realistically, we
should look for ways of investigating how these concepts are applied when they’re
really being used and when the applications have a point. Baz rightly points out
that generally, “the point of an everyday question guides us in answering it and
in assessing our own and other people’s answers, [but] this guidance is lacking
when the theorist invites us to answer his question.”78 Not only is the language
likely to be on holiday in this kind of situation, but the mathematician might be
on holiday too in essence. If virtues must be understood relative, in part, to prac-
tices, then an individual mathematician isn’t the locus for revealing the value of a
particular proof. That same mathematician might find the proof, say, explanatory
in the context of one practice and not in the context of another. Clearly, philoso-
phers of mathematics interested in understanding mathematical practice have to
do something like the kind of empirical work Inglis and Aberdein are attempt-
ing, but perhaps we need to rethink the methods used in collecting this kind of
information.79 Finding uses of the various ways of speaking about the virtues a
78(Baz 2012: 105)
79The methodological principles advocated in this section are similar to those accepted in eth-
nomethodology and the sociology of scientific knowledge. (See, e.g., (Livingston 1986: 1), (Lynch
1993: 14-15), andmore recently François and Van Kerkhove (2010) for ethnomethodology. Barnes
et al. (1996) is a good example of the sociology of knowledge that deals with mathematics in its
final chapter.) Many of the authors within these fields also take inspiration from Wittgenstein, so
the resemblance isn’t coincidental. The goal of “pure description” for which ethnomethodologists
put this kind of methodology to use is, however, likely to be different from the goals of philosophers
of mathematics who make use of the methodology outlined here. Being a methodology though,
the realistic view on offer doesn’t seek to dictate the uses to which it’s put.
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mathematical proof might possess “in the wild” (i.e., while really in use) is likely
to give us a better picture of the way these dimensions of a proof are evaluated
and put us in a better position to understand the way the practice views virtuous
performances of proving.
6 Further Questions and Conclusions
Philosophers of mathematics have often aimed to better understand portions of
mathematical practice by first looking for the virtues particular mathematicians see
in some piece ofmathematics. Revealing the practice through its values is often the
point of talking about virtues in relation to mathematics in the first place. If what’s
been said here is on the right track, an investigation of at least some of the main
structural features of the practice should, instead, come first. Looking closely at
practice using a realistic methodology and a rich framework within which virtues
can disclose themselves rather than assuming a collection of virtues that apply
to the mathematical domain at the outset reveals numerous places where virtue-
theoretic thinking can play a role that might easily be overlooked otherwise. Seeing
mathematical practice as being an epistemic, objectual practice involved in dealing
with a massive knowledge base leads to numerous questions about how to cope
with this ever-expanding resource and about how to produce mathematicians who
can virtuously cope with the expansion. Seeing mathematical practice as dynamic
and extending across traditions allows us to ask questions such as: What conditions
favor development or stagnation in a field? or What kinds of arguments are used to
get others to accept a conceptual variant or reject it over time?80 Answers to these
questions can reveal perhaps unexpected virtues of mathematical environments
and products. Thinking in terms of the characters and careers of mathematical
practitioners allows us to ask how the goals of the discipline impose demands and
traits on those involved in mathematical practice and how the characteristics of
80Cf. (Toulmin 1972: 505-506)
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those that enter the discipline shape the goals of a given subject.81 Finally, taking
a realistic view of the practice can help safeguard us from following false leads and
jumping to conclusions, but it also poses the problem of finding data and evidence
that can be used reliably. There have been more than enough calls to action for
philosophers of mathematics and its practice to remedy theoretical problems of
various sorts. I’ve tried to do more than just raise a call here, but clearly there’s
still a lot to be done.
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